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A bstract
Exc l udabl e and congest i bl e shared goods - club goods (e. g. ,i nternet
accessfacil i ties) -are m ore prevalent than Sam uel sonian publ i cgoods.W e
constructan exam pl et os how thattheopti ma l s econd-bestpr ovi sion l evel
ofa club good m ight exceed its ¯rst-best level.Th i si su n l i ke the usual
presum ption w i th pure publ i c goods. W e argue that our ¯nding ari ses
because userchargescan bel evied on club goods;thegovernm entneed not
i m pos edi stortionary taxeson othergoodsto ¯nance them . T hus,the onl y
practi caldi®erence between the ¯rstand second besti nac l ub econom y is
t hati nf or ma t i onalconstraintspr eventthe governm entachievingtheri ght
distributi on of i ncom ei nt he l atter.
JE L C l assi¯cat i on: 022,024
(P reli mi nary; not be be quoted dir ectl ywi t hout perm ission.)
1I n t r o d u c t i on
Al arge th eoreticall i terature com pares the ¯rst-b est (F -B ) an d secon d-b est (S-
B)pr ovi sion ofa purepubl i cgood [ e.g.,A tki nson an d S tern (1974), K ing (1986),
B atti n a (1991), W il son (1991a,b),C hang (2000). ) and G aube (2000)] .I nt h e
FB a l l ocati on,a pl anneruses unrestri cted lum p- sum taxation to achi eve w hat-
ever al l ocati on of pri vate and shared goods i tt h i nks ¯t ,s ubj ect onlyt ot h e
econom y' s overall resource constraint In the S B , the p lanner i s constrained
to use distortionary m eans of¯nanci ng the shared good and househol d-sp eci¯c
0W e are indebted to M yrna W oodersforprovi ding uswi th a useful reference an d to M arco
M ariotti for supp lyi ng a copy ofhi sf orthcom ing paper wi th P aola M anzi ni .
1budgetconstrai n t so pe r a t e .Al though thisl i terature is stil li nconcl usi ve i ng e n -
eral,t hepr es um pt i on - based on a series ofspecial cases - is that there wi l lbe
underprovi sion i n t heSB,bo t h i n term s of th e levelof the good and the f act
thatprovi sion i s taken to a poi nt where the wi l l i ngness to pay f or the good at
them argi n exceeds its m arginalcost.T he basi ci ntui tion f orthi s presum pti on i s
tw ofol d:¯r s t ,Pi gou' s (1947) argum ent thatdi stortionary tax ¯nanci n gma k e s
the totalw el f are costofthe publ i c good exceed its producti on cost;second,the
i dea that the opti ma ll evel of a publi c good shoul db ei n verselyr e l ated to i ts
totalcost. 1
Empi ri call y,there are few exam ples ofpure publi cgoods( def enceand broad-
casting bei ng perhaps the notabl e excep tions). M ost shared goods seem to be
either excludabl e (as is even broadcasti ng) or/and congesti bl et os o mee x t e n t .
Cl ub goods are congesti bl e and excludabl e shared goods[ cf.B uchanan (1965)] .
A rchetypalexam pl es incl ude sw i mmi ngpool s, internetservi cesand toll ed trun k
roads. T hi sn o t ee x a mi nes w h ether the presu m ed relati onship betw een FB and
SB l evelso fp r o v i sion f o rap u r ep u b l i c good carri es over to clu bg o o d s .We
wi l l d em on strate th at, contrary to th e case w ith pure publ i c goods,the SB i na
club econom y i squi te li kel yt ob ec ha r a c t e r i sed by overprovision ifdi stributi onal
consi derati ons predom i nate i n t heFB.Thi s¯ nd i ng i s very simi l ar to G aube' s
(2000) for a pure publ i c good but,as we wi l lar gue bel o w,f or rath er di®erent
reasons.
Th e r ea r ewe l lknown di ±c u l ti es i n m odel l i ng cl ub goods [ see, e. g. , Fraser
and H ol l ander (2001)] .Ch i ef am ong these are the need to ensure self - selection
ofi ndi vi dual s who di ®er and the m utualconsi stency betw een theirut i l i sation
ofthe cl ub and the l evelofqual i ty w hich they perceive. Speci alprobl em s ari se
w hen we seek to com pare the FB and the SB. In the conventi onal anal ysi s
of a pure publ i c good, i ti s usual l y assum ed that the good i s of unvaryi ng
qual i ty, irresp ective of the num ber of users, or the l evel of provision is taken
to be synonym ous w i th qual i t y ,wi th th e focus si mp l yo nt h a tl evel. H ow ever,
club goods ofa gi ven type can di®eri nt w od i me n s i on s: the qu antity an d th e
qual i ty ofprovi si on (e. g. ,the si ze ofthe sw immi ng pooland i tsaverage l evel of
congesti on). Thus,i nc o mp a r i ng l evelsofprovi si on i nt heFB a ndS B, wer e a l l y
need som e notion ofqual i ty-ad justed qu antity. In th ispaper,w ew i l l¯nessethi s
di ±c u l ty by focusi ng on the cases where FB and SB l evelsofqual i ty coinci de,
l eaving the com pari son to be m ade onl yb e t w een the respecti ve quanti ties of
pr ovi sion ( and,ofcour s e,thenumber sofuser s )i nt h et w oc a s e s .
For our anal ysi s ,wewi l le mpl oy the Fraser-H oll ander m odelof second-best
club provi sion [ cf.: Fraser and H oll ander, Cornes and Sandl er (1996), Fraser
(2000)].I nt h i s m odel ,whi ch buil ds on the approach of, e.g. ,Br i to and O ak-
l and (1980)and Fraser(1996)f or excludabl ep ub l i cgoods,atom i stic con sum ers
conf r o n tape rv i sitpr i ce, faci l i t ys i ze and conjectured qual i ty for a cl ub good.
Ta ki n g these as param etric, they sel f -select to clu b m em b ersh ip or otherw ise.
I na n yN a s he q u i l i bri um whi ch resu lts, theirs i mu l taneous acti ons determ i ne
the l evel of club congesti on, hence qual i t y ,wh i ch th ey confront. In turn, an
1See G aube (2000)on thispresum pti on.
2entrepreneurialclub good suppl i er can use the dem and schedul e,w hich it( c or -
rectl y) anti ci pates w il lbe ge ner at ed by t heconsum er s 'j oi nt acti ons, to deter-
mi ne the opti ma lp r i ce and l evel of faci l i t y provision w hi ch it shoul do ® e rt o
f ul ¯li ts ob jectives.
2 The M odel
Al though there are m any types of clubs i n practice, w e restrict attention to a
si ngl e-club econom y forsi mp l i cit y. 2 Sup p ose there are N consu m ers, allhavi ng
an i denti cal uti l i ty functi on, U [ : ] .T h i si s de¯ned over the quanti ty, x, of a
pr i vate consum pti on good,vi sits to or u se of a club good, v,and i ts qual i ty,
q. The pri vate good is the num erai re and i s a necessi ty. T h e club good i sno t
a necessi ty and need not be dem anded at l ow incom es. To m ake the anal ysi s
i nteresti ng,we f oc us on cas es whe re i ndi vi dual swi th su ± cientl yl ow i ncom es
wi l lchoose notto consum e the cl ub good. W e assum e:
(A .1)U i s strictly concave increasi ng i n x,concavei ncreasi ng i n v and non-
decreasi ng i nq .




have an absol ut el y
conti nuous densi t y, dF (m ). T his densi ty is know n to the governm ent or any
other cl ub suppl i er,but they cannot i denti f yt h ei n c o meo fag i ven person for
tax or price di scri mi nat i on purposes.
A s we assum e exogenous i ncom e, there are no incenti ve e®ects associated
wi th providi ng and ¯nanci ng the cl ub good. W e speci al i se F (m ) presently.
We a l so assu m e th at a club' s qual i ty isi ncreasing i ni ts faci l i t ys i ze,y,and
decreasi ng i ni ts aggregate uti l i sation,V .Thus,
(A .3) @ q(y;V )=@ y ´ q1(y;V ) > 0; @ q(y;V )=@ V ´ q2(y;V ) < 0
Th ef acil i ty size w i l ls i mp l y be m easured by the expendi ture on the club:
one uni t ofexpendi ture purchases one unit of "facil i ty."
To m ake the anal ysi s tractable,suppose further thatthe qual i t yf uncti on i s
hom ogeneous ofdegree zero i n y and V :
(A .4)q(y;V )´ q(y=V );q0>0
(A .4)i st hef orm m ost com m onlyu t i l i sed int h el i terature. W h en the qu ali ty
f unct i on i soft hi sf orm ,qual i t y depends solelyo nt h el eveloffaci l i ty p rovision
per use ofthe cl ub.I ti swe l lknown thatthi si sthe onl yf orm for w hi ch the FB
"tol l , "i fl evied,woul dr e s u l ti nt h ec l ub breaki ng even (K olm ,1974;M ohri ng
and H arw i tz, 1962). H ere,the FB "tol l "i sc l u bme mb e r s 'i denti cal m arginal
wi l l i ngness to pay f or a m argi nalvi sitb yf oregoing pri vate con sum p tion and
m ustequalt heval ue ofthe qual i ty degradati on that m argi nalvi siti m poses on
club u sers.
Fi nal l y, w e w i l l restrict attention to the tw o fam i l i es of uti l i t yf uncti ons
f or w hi ch opti ma lq u a l i t yp r o v i sion int h ec l ub i si ndependent of the i ncom e
di stributi on i f( A. 4) hol ds [ Fraser (2000)] :
2Even the m ost sophisticated com pari sons ofFB and SB provi sion ofpure publ i c goods
thatall ow form any pri vate goods[ e.g. ,G aube (2000)]consi deronl y one publ i c good.
3(A .5)Ei th er allconsum ers have uti l i ty funct i on (a) U (x;v;q)´ u(x;vq),or
al lhaveut i l i ty funct i on (b)U (x;v;q)´ u(x;veq=k), for som e scalar k > 0.
Forbr evi ty,w e actuall yo n l y consi derexpl i citlyu t i l i t yf uncti onsofthe f orm
(A .5)(a). B ut, iti s w orth stressing our resul ts exten d to util i ti es (A .5)(b).
TheFi rst B est
I nt heFB,t heg o v e r n me n tha sf ul li nf orm ati on about consum ers'incom es.
T hus, i ti sa b l e to pool resources to achi eve any di stribut i on of pri vate and
club good consum pti on, hence w el f are,i tt h i nks ¯t,subj ect to the econom y' s
overallendowm ent. A s everyone has the sam e uti l i ty funct i on, int h eF Ba n
ut i l i tarian governm ent equal i ses allcons um er s 'ut i l i ties. It chooses the l evel s
ofcl ub provi sion and pri vate good consum pti on w hi ch m axi mi ses uti l i ty w ith
everyone treated equal l y.
D enote faci l i ty provision per use of(vi si tt o )t hec l ub by p -i . e. ,p´ y= V.
Th e n,g i ven (A . 4), q = q(p). W e w il l adopt the norm ali sati on q(0) = 0. Let




: u[ m ¡ pv;vq(p)] (1)
Us i ng( *)t oi ndi cate the F B ,the tw o ¯ rst-ord er cond itions(FO C )characteri sing
an FB opti m um are:








Ata ni nteri or sol ut i o n,t h eFOCsr e d u c et o
p ¤q0(p¤)= q( p¤)( 4 )
Th i si denti ¯es the uni que p¤ i f( A. 5)(a)hol ds .I ti sal so the un iquep¤ f orw hi ch
the quali ty p rovision peruni tofexpendi ture i s m axi mi s e d.No t ea l so from (2)
that,i fv¤ =0 ,
¡u 1( m; 0 ) p ¤ +u 2( m ;0)q(p¤)· 0 ( 5 )
If th e club good i s norm al ,w hen (5) hol dswi th equal i ty iti denti ¯es a uni que
me a ni nc om e,m ¤ say, b elow w hi ch v¤ = 0 and above w hi ch v¤ > 0. The FB





4The Second B est
In the SB ,the governm ent does not know each househol d' si ncom e and can-
notr edi stribute between them . Itcan onl y ¯x the qual i ty provision ofthe cl ub
good and,by usi ng the revenues derived from a break- even per visit tolll evi ed
on the facil i ty w hen consum ers self -select, the overalll evel of provi si on. Thi s
si tuati on i ssuper¯ci al l ys i mi l arto the SB w i th a pu re p ub li c good anal ysed i n
the li terature. In the latter (ep itom ised by G aube (2000)),the governm entsets
the w elf are m aximi sing l evelofthe publi c good and tax rate(s)on pri vate com -
mo d i ties,subjectto breaking even,gi ven opti m alchoi cesby consum ers.B ecause
of the non- excludabi l i t y ofa pure publ i c good and the consequent pref erence
revelati on probl em ,the governm ent cannot charge directlyf ori ti n t heSB.I n-
stead,i t m ust be ¯nanced by di stortionary tax(es)on othergoods.C onversel y,
because ofthe excl udabi l i ty of a club good,i t can be charged for directly,m i ti -
gati ng bot h t hef ree rider probl em and the need to i m pose di stortionary taxes
on othergoods 3. Thus,theSB natureofthegovernm ent' spr o bl em in suppl yi ng
ac l ub good l i es m ai nl yi nt h ef act that i ti sunabl et ol evy unrestricted lum p
sum taxes and thereby obtain the "ri ght" distribut i on ofi ncom e. W e wi l ls e e
thatthi sm eans that,when everyone i si denti caland there are no di stributi onal
concer ns ,t heFB and SB coi nci de i no u r c l ub m odel ,unl i ke i nt h ec a s ew i th a
pure publ i c good.
Suppose now the governm entannouncesa tol lpwh i ch ituses to ¯nance the
qual i ty p rovision per vi si t. It can be shown [ Fraser (2000)] that, given (A .4)
and (A . 5)(a), itwi l lchoose the FB p,p¤,i n t heSB.A hous ehol dw i th incom e






and the resul ti ng FOC (wi th ¤¤ indi cating SB m agni tu des)4





No t i ce from (8) th at the con sum er w ith incom em wi l lnotbuy the cl ub good
i f
¡u 1(m ;0)p ¤ +u 2(m ;0)q(p¤)· 0 ( 9 )
By i ns pect i on of (5) and (9) hol di ng wi th equal i ty, iti s obvi ous th at the m
wh i ch leaves a consum er i ndi ®erent betw een m aki ngvi sits an d otherw ise int h e
3A s the club ismo de l l ed as a luxury good,the governm entw i l lnot i m pose distortionary
taxes on private goodsto ¯nancei t.
4In general,an househol dwi l lc hoosethev¤¤ wh i ch m axi mi ses its utili ty an d then choose
t ob eac l ub userif ,a tt ha tv ¤¤,i tobtains uti lity at le a s ta sg r e a ta sf rom spending al li ts
i ncom e on the privategood.Ifuti lity takes a d i®erent form f rom those in( A. 5),an househol d
mi ghtget uti lity w h ich isl ess than that from consum ing the pri vate good al one at a v > 0
wh i ch satis¯es the counterpart of(8)(i )wi th equal i ty. See Fraser and H oll ander (2001) for
such intri cacies.
5SB i s preciselyt h el evelof m ean i n c o mewh i ch leaves the governm ent indi ®er -
ent betw een provi di ng t he cl ub good and not i nt h eF B . I . e.,denoti ng the m
wh i ch sol v e s( 9 )wi th equal i ty by m ¤¤,weha vem ¤¤ =m ¤.I ti sa l so imme d i -
atel y apparentf rom thiscom pari son thati fever yonei si dent i cal,thuseveryone
h a sme a ni n c o mem = m , then each w ould choose the FB l evel of cl ub good
consum pti on,v¤,i n t heSB.I n thatevent ,wewoul d have y¤ =y ¤¤. 5
R etu rning to the case ofnon- i denti cali ndi vi dual s, the p enultim ate observa-
ti on suggests why we m i ght then expect y¤ <y ¤¤. E ven ifm· m ¤ =m ¤¤,
thus y¤ = 0 ,wewi l lha vey ¤¤ > 0 provided there exi sts som e consu m er(s) w ith
i ncom e(s) m > m ¤¤:O fcours e,the com pari son i s onl y non-trivi al i fm> m ¤¤
-i . e.,i fme an i ncom e iss u±c i entl yh i gh f or the governm ent to w i sh to sup ply
the club good. W e assum e thi sf rom hereon.




,i t can be show n that all
wi th incom e m > m ¤¤ wi l l use th e club and those w i th m < m ¤¤ wi l lnot. Cl ub
us er swi l ls at i sfy (8)(i)wi th equ ali t y. W e can invert this to obtaint h e i ropti ma l









¤)dF (m ) (10)
3 A n Exam pl e
To com pare y¤ giv e nb y( 6 )wi th y ¤¤ gi ven by (10),we w i l ls pe c i al i se th e u til -
i ty and di stributi on functi ons f u rth er. 6 Suppose the uti l i ty functi on takes the
f ol l owi ng f orm (an extensi on ofthe l i near expendi tu re system to all ow for zero
club consum pti on):
(A .6) u (x;vq) = (x ¡ x)
(1¡ ° ) (vq + ")
°,f or scal ars x ,"> 0 ,1> °> 0 ,
x<M.
Suppose al so thatthe popul ati on di stributi on f uncti on isPa r e t owi th M=
1:
(A .7)F (m )=
½
0; m < M
1¡ ( M =m )
® ; m¸M
In (A .7),® > 0 i s a param eter and ® > 2 is requi red for the vari ance of
i nc omet obewe l l -de¯ned. T he m ean incom ei s now given by m=® M=(® ¡ 1);
thus ® > 1 i sr e qui red for m ean in c o met obewe l l - de¯ned. 7
As s u mi ng an i nteri or soluti on, each consum er' s opti ma lc l ub usage i nt h e
FB can be show n to equal
5Thi sc o i nci dence of the FB and SB wi th identi cal indi vi dual si sd e r i ved here f or the
fam il i esofuti l i ty and congesti on functi ons in( A. 4)and (A . 5)(a). It can be show n to h oldf o r
allwel l-behaved uti l i ty functionsU (x;v;q)i f( A. 4)hol ds.
6al-N ow aihiand Fraser (2001) consider generalutil i ty an d distribution functions.





































To m ake the probl em interestin g ,wea s s u met h a tas t r i ct inequal i ty h olds
i n( 1 2 ) .Th eFB l evelofclub provi sion ist he n
y¤ =Np ¤v¤ =
°N
®¡1
[ ®M ¡( ® ¡1 ) m ¤]( 1 3 )
In the S B , th e con sum er w ith incom e m solves the problem (7) to yiel d
opti ma l c l ub usage gi ven by
v(m )=
°





p¤ (m ¡ m
¤)( 1 4 )








¡( 1 ¡®) dm = N °M
®m
¤( 1¡ ®)=( 1¡ ®) ( 15 )
He nc e
y¤¤ ¡y ¤ =
°N
®¡1M
®m ¤(1¡ ® ) ¡
°N
















Tos i gn y¤¤ ¡y ¤,wewi l luset he f oll ow i n g theorem .
Th e o r e m 1 ®> ( 1¡z ®)=(1¡ z)i f ®>1 ; 1 >z >0 :
P roof .Th e o r e m 1f oll ow s from tw o lem m as.
Lem m a 1.Le tf( z)= 1¡ z+ zl n z , 1 >z >0 : T h e nf ( z ) >0 .
P roofofLem m a 1.f0( z ) =¡1 +1 +l nz= l nz< 0,f( 1)= 1¡ 1+ 1l n1=
0.
)f ( z ) >0f or all z 2 (0;1):
L e mma2 .L e t f ( ® )= ®¡( 1 ¡z ®)= (1 ¡ z), ® > 1, 1 > z > 0. T hen
f( ®)> 0.











f0( 1)= 1+ zl nz
1¡ z = 1
1¡ z [ 1¡ z¡ zl nz ] > 0b yL e mma1 .
)f ( ® ) >0f or al l ®>1 ; 1 >z >0 .
T heorem 1 foll ow s fr o m Le mma2 .
T heorem 1 and 16 now enabl e us to prove our centralresul t.
T heorem 2 Ifu (x;vq)= (x ¡ x)
(1 ¡ ° ) (vq + ")
° and the popul at i on densi ty is
P areto ((A .7)),then y¤¤ >y ¤:
P roof . From (16),
y¤¤ >y ¤ ,® > m ¤( 1¡ ®)(m ¤® ¡M






















´( 1 ¡z ®)=(1 ¡ z) (17)
l etting z ´ M =m ¤ <1 : We r e ®i nteger-valued,(1¡ z®)=(1 ¡ z) woul dr e p r e -
s e n tt h es u m t o®¡1t e r mso f ag e o me t r i c progressi on wi th ¯rst term 1 and
c o mmo nr a t i o betw een successi v et e r mso fz< 1 . I ti st h e nt r i vi al to show
that® > (1¡ z®)=(1 ¡ z) f or integer ® ¸ 2. For other value sof®,we can use
Th e o r e m 1 .As® > 1i s requi red form ean i n c o met ob ed e ¯ n e da n d®> 2f or
the variance,w e can concl ude f rom (17) and T heorem 1 that y¤¤ >y ¤:
4D i scussion and C oncl usi on
Is it reasonabl et ob e l i e v et ha tc l ub goods w i l lbeunde rpr ovi ded i n the second
b est, as is usual l y presum ed w i th pure publ i c goods? Thi s paper show s, via
an exam ple, that thi si s unl i kelyt ob es o .U n l i ke pure publ i c goods, cl ub
goods can be charged f ordi rectly. A governm ent need not im pose distortionary
taxes on other goods to ¯nance cl ubs. T hi s m eans that, practical l y,the onl y
i m portant source ofdi ® erence b etw een the ¯ rst b est and the second b est ina
club econom y is the governm ent' si nabi l i ty to achieve the correct distributi on
of i ncom e int h el atter du e to inf orm ati onalconstrai nts. In the SB , incom es
di ®er and t he r el ati vel yr i ch are the one w ho are m ore l i kelyt ob u yt h ec l ub
good. The governm ent has to ¯x the si ze of the club f aci l i ty to satisfyt h e i r
dem and f or i ta tt h eS B t o l land qual i t y .I ti st h i s need to m eet the relati vel y
hi gh cl ub dem and by the rel ati vel y w ealthy w hich resu lts in "overprovision"
i n the SB com pared w i th the F B . U n li ke the case wi t hap u r ep u b l i c good,
the governm ent cannot use the club good as a redi stribut i ve devi ce because i t
cannot pri ce di scri mi n ate (by assu m ption),not everyone uses i ta ndt h o s et ha t
do us e di ®erent am ounts. T hus,al though our expl anati on for overp rovision i n
the cl ub SB hi nge on di stributi onal consi derations as does G aube' sf or pure
publ i c goods,ourm echani sm s are very d i®er ent .
O ur observations have been derived from a club m odeli nwh i ch FB and SB
club "tol l s" and qual i ties coinci de,l eaving com pari son onlyt ob ema d eb e t we e n
8the faci l i ty sizes (and nu m b ers of u sers) in the two cases. If we depart f rom
these circum stances, i twi l l stil l be possi bl ef or the governm ent to ¯nance the
club good by user charges rather than di stortionary taxes ifi tw i sh es. F B
and SB "tol l s ",qual i ties and f aci l i ty siz e swi l lt he n di ®eri n general,butt he se
di ®er enc eswi l lagai np r i ma r i l y re°ect distribut i onal considerations [Fraser and
Ho l l ander(2001)] .
N ote,¯nal l y, that our resul ts can be regarded as com plem entary to those
of Scotchm er (1985) and M anzi ni and M ari otti (M & M , 2001, f orthcom ing).
T hey also ¯nd evi dence of "excesses" i ns o mea s p e c t so fc l ub good provi sion.
Scotchm er shows thatthe equi l i br i um num berof¯rm swhi ch enter a m arket to
suppl yac l ub f acil i ty w il lexceed the e± cient num ber - there wi l lbe t oo m any
club s. M & M stud y of a three-con sum er n on -cooperati vegam e ofcl ub f orm ati on
establ i shes a "tragedy of clubs": the possi bi l i ty that there w il lbe excess entry
o f me mb e r si nto a si ngl ec l ub.B oth these anal yses consideri dent i calconsum ers
(w it hM&M' sha vi ng m arket p ow er) w hil ewec ons i derat om i sti c,heterogeneous,
pr i ce- and qual i t y-taki ng ones U nl i k eM&M' sc l ub, our SB cl ub has t oo f ew
me mb e r s- i ti st hep r o v i sion f orthem w hi ch iss oc i al l y excessive.
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